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"With leveraging, there will always exist the possibility ... of a cascading sequence of defaults that will culminate in financial implosion if it proceeds unchecked," Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, at a May 8, 1998 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago conference. This statement was made regarding banks in developing countries relying excessively on borrowing from abroad. It is, as well, very much applicable to the corporate financing patterns of corporates in some Asian countries.
OVERVIEW
What Caused Asia's economic and currency crisis, and the ensuing contagion is the subject of much debate. Most of the explanations on the causes of the crisis of the Asia crisis have focused on macroeconomic factors, including underlying vulnerabilities 2 (financial sector vulnerabilities, and inconsistent macro economic policies), emphasis on the role of financial panic as an essential element in the crisis 3 , and the distortionary impact of guarantees on the financial system 4 .
This paper provides an perspective on the corporate roots of the financial crisis in Asia.
McKinsey Global Institute recently studied how Germany, Japan, and the US put their capital to use, examining capital productivity within the entire economy as well as in five separate industries 5 . The study addresses the productive use of capital: use of physical capital (machinery and buildings) and by reference the implication for derived financial assets-stocks. The findings are that the US outperforms Japan and Germany by roughly one-third: the US average returns of 9 percent over a 20-year period compare with just over 7 percent in Germany and Japan. The higher capital productivity translated into higher financial returns for equity investors. Michael Jensen's Presidential Address to the American Finance Association documents that a large number of US corporations do not earn the cost of capital 6 . It pursues the line of argument advanced by Frank Veneroso and 2 World Bank, Global Development Finance, 1998 3 Radelet, Steven and Jeffrey Sachs, The Onset of the East Asian Financial Crisis, Harvard Institute for International Development, March 30, 1998. 4 Krugman argues that a system of implicit guarantees lead to incentives to choose the highest return investments regardless of risk (refereed to as the Pangloss value) See Krugman, Paul What happened to Asia? January 1998 5 Agrawal, Raj et al in Capital Productivity: Why the US Leads and Why it Matters , The McKinsey Quarterly, 1996 Number 3 6 Jensen, Michael C, The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems,
Robert Wade in The Asian Financial Crisis: the Unrecognized Risk of the IMF's Asia
Package, 1998 7 . Veneroso and Wade argue that Asia's high-debt model of economic development is a consequence of the intermediation process for savings in the Asian economies, and quest for rapid economic growth. In a similar line of inquiry the paper explores the financial profile and performance of capital in developing countries. Key ratios for companies in various countries are presented in the paper. The global benchmarking imposes a consistent cross-border analysis of financial risk and performance, and sheds light on the crisis.
The analysis extends empirically, and complements the macro leverage argument of Veneroso and Wade by reviewing the financial profile and performance of corporations. It concludes that there were serious problems at the micro level -excess leverage, and poor profitability. The findings support the view advanced by Krugman that crony capitalism, and the supportive bad policies-implicit guarantees, and poor banking supervision-lead to poor credit decisions in the banking system, and misallocation of resources. The evident policy implications virtually write themselves, and ensue from the analysis.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section A presents the financial analysis methodology, key results and their interpretation. Section B offers a discussion of the implications of the crisis on corporate finances, and documents that it was not an accident that the crisis started in Thailand, in light of the profound excesses. The concluding section offers an interpretation of the causes of the high leverage of corporates, and policy implications for financial sector development. 
FINANCING PATTERNS
Leverage. I use the debt-equity ratio equals a company's debt divided by shareholder's equity, and indicates how much borrowed money a company is using relative to its equity. T h a i l a n d J a p a n K o r e a F r a n c e I n d o n e s i a U S A P h i l i p p i n e s T a i w a n M a l a y s i a S i n g a p o r e G e r m a n y H o n g K o n g L a t i n A m e r i c a Total Debt/Equity Figure 2 Increase in Leverage, 1992 vs. 1996
H o n g K o n g I n d o n e s i a K o r e a M a l a y s i a P h i l i p p i n e s S i n g a p o r e T a i w a n T h a i l a n d
Total Debt/Equity Tangible Fixed Assets Growth and their financing. Capital assets are tangible "fixed assets." The analysis in Table 3 and graph in Figure 3 suggests a rapid built up of Fixed I n d o n e s i a T h a i l a n d S i n g a p o r e M a l a y s i a H o n g K o n g K o r e a P h i l i p p i n e s T a i w a n L a t i n A m e r i c a J a p a n U S A G e r m a n y F r a n c e I estimate the financing patterns of new investment based on an analysis of Sources and Uses of Funds 16 . In Table 4 I use the cash flow analysis to estimate the total percent debt funding of investment in fixed assets, and calculate Total debt financing of investment as a ratio of investments for each year 17 . The results support the conclusion of the increasing reliance on debt in Asian countries.
The wide disparity in funding patters are striking. Figure 4 shows that while Latin American, German, Japanese and US companies relied on roughly 8-19 percent debt financing, the ratios in the vulnerable countries in Asia ranges around 45-78 percent, with
Indonesia averaging 69 percent from 93 to 96, Korea 69 percent , Malaysia 45 percent, 16 Cash flow is computed as the difference between incoming and outgoing payments. Cash Flow is derived from the Operating Profit by adjusting for items, which do not affect payments (e.g. depreciation and amortization), and items (e.g. changes in working capital) which affect payments but are not recorded in the Operating Profit.
Cash Flow statement explains the difference between cash at the beginning of the period, and cash at the end of the period. Free Cash Flow before income taxes and financial income is available for payment to stockholders, and creditors income tax payments, and for investments.
and Thailand 78 percent vs. moderate ratios in Hong Kong (45 percent), and Philippines 25 percent.
Figure 4
In this context, the key ratio medians for U.S. industrial companies (Table 5 ) calculated by Standard and Poor 18 , and factored in the rating process are illustrative 19 . Although what is a sustainable ratio differs by country (and industry), it is the norm to expect companies with solid potential, and stable earnings and prudent financial policies to total debt to capitalization is 40 percent (a Debt/Equity ratio of 66 percent). A thematic point that comes across from the evidence on the corporate investment and funding analysis is unsustainable rapid investment in fixed assets financed by excessive borrowing in some Asian countries. These findings manifest the untenable business growth in Asian countries. It is a reasonable premise that no well managed company 20 can digest in a 18 Explanations and medians for the ratios for U.S. companies can be found in Standard & Poor Rating Services, Corporate Ratings Criteria . 19 The benign interest rate environment and availability of term financing in the US suggests that the US numbers represent an upper bound on acceptable financial practices. 20 With the possible exception of software companies.
Average Percent Debt Financing of New Investment, 1993-96
T h a i l a n d K o r e a I n d o n e s i a T a i w a n M a l a y s i a H o n g K o n g S i n g a p o r e P h i l i p p i n e s L a t i n A m e r i c a J a p a n U S A G e r m a n y F r a n c e Debt raised,repaid/Investments prudent fashion annual growth of 30-40 percent without stretching already thin managerial capacity, and distribution and marketing channels. Total Current Liabilities/Total Liabilities. The Total Current Liabilities/Total Liabilities ratio is simply a company's current liabilities divided by its Total Liabilities. From this ratio, I determine the maturity structure of the companies debts, and pending refinancing needs in Table 6 and Figure 5 . A more comprehensive liquidity analysis can be supplemented by other ratios, such as Current Ratio 21 . S i n g a p o r e T a i w a n H o n g K o n g T h a i l a n d M a l a y s i a P h i l i p p i n e s J a p a n K o r e a I n d o n e s i a F r a n c e L a t i n A m e r i c a U S A G e r m a n y
The maturity structure of debt presented for 1992-1996 indicates in Table 5 EBITDA/Interest. Debt service analysis uses the ratio of operating cash flow, before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) to annual interest on the loans or debt service.
The EBITDA coverage ratio is indicative of the ability of the cash flow to adequately pay back the annual interest (EBITDA/Interest) and principal (EBITDA/Interest + Principal) on outstanding debt. The findings presented in Table 7 and Figure 6 are indicative of vast differences across countries. 30.00 L a t i n A m e r i c a H o n g K o n g S i n g a p o r e U S A G e r m a n y M a l a y s i a F r a n c e J a p a n T a i w a n P h i l i p p i n e s I n d o n e s i a T h a i l a n d H o n g K o n g M a l a y s i a U S A G e r m a n y P h i l i p p i n e s T a i w a n S i n g a p o r e I n d o n e s i a J a p a n L a t i n A m e r i c a F r a n c e T h a i l a n d K o r e a Return on Equity, average 1992-96
The findings in Table 9 and Figure 8 The analysis of the ROCE data for Thailand, supplemented by the previous ROE and Leverage documents that it was not an accident that the Asian crisis started in Thailand.
Financial risk portrayed by quantitative means illustrates that Thailand was an outlier in every regard ! Virtually all the evidence presented suggests that the performance of Thai companies has deteriorated progressively during the period: credit ratios have declined, margins have been squeezed, and a significant decline in ROE is evident from 13 percent in 1992 to 5 percent in 1996. S i n g a p o r e T a i w a n K o r e a T h a i l a n d P h i l i p p i n e s F r a n c e J a p a n G e r m a n y Economic value added. To address opportunity costs, to which we alluded in the ROCE analysis, we introduce a concept that has entered the financial lexicon, which is Shareholder Economic Value Added(EVA). Stern Stewart & Co. developed the concept called EVA to measure the value added 26 . This analysis determines in a traditional economic sense --using opportunity costs --whether the company creates shareholder value. EVA is trying to answer how does the reported profitability of a corporation--the measured ROCE compare to the opportunity cost of capital 27 . A Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is used to assess opportunity costs, and determine the economic loss/ gain. An advantage of EVA is that it links internal financial performance (corporate profitability) and external financial costs in the capital markets by introducing an external benchmark hurdle opportunity rate that reflects the prevailing cost of capital: if the difference between the cost and ROCE is positive, wealth has been created, if it is not, wealth has been destroyed. The Methodology for Return on Economic Capital Analysis uses comprehensive EVA calculations that develop net present value method of the modified cash flow, and develop calculations of WACC 28 .
Although an oversimplification of rigorous EVA analysis (which uses discounted present values), in this paper 29 I limit the analysis to obtaining a rough indication of EVA by comparing the ROCE to the following lending rates (Table 11) in the banking systems (that proxy the cost for mobilizing debt) for 1992-1996. The difference between ROCE and Lending Rates in Exhibit is indicative of the EVA (Table 12) . Only for Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United States ROCE exceeds the cost of that capital base consistently over the 1992-1996 period ( and with the exception of Hong Kong, not by a significant margin). However, there are vast inter-temporal differences as well: trends in Economic Value Added document the decline in EVA and deterioration in Thailand. Similarly, Japan positive EVA is largely attributable to the low interest rate prevailing, rather than high ROCE. In contrast, the analysis suggests that the negative EVA in Indonesia is attributable to the high prevailing domestic interest rates. Following in Figure 10 are the finding on average economic value added during the period. n/a n/a -8% Latin America n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a France -3% -4% -2% -3% -2% -3% Germany -10% -11% -7% -8% -5% -8% Japan 0% 1% 0% 2% 3% 1% USA 3% 3% 4% 3% 5% 4% Figure 10 Tobin's Q . Tobin's q was introduced in 1969 by James Tobin to be used as a predictor of a company's future investments. The q ratio is a market-to-book ratio: the ratio of a company's equity plus debt to the value of the firm's assets, adjusted for inflation and depreciation. The q ratio indicates whether the company has been able to create value for shareholders with the assets under their control 30 , and measures how much investors are willing to pay for the business. A Tobin q ratio over 1 means management has added value for shareholders; and a Tobin q ratio lower than 1 indicates value has been lost.
Therefore, the ration measures the signals created by the equity markets in the respective markets to invest in fixed assets, or take over existing assets. In this analysis it is used as indicative countries' growth and profitability prospects, sheding light on whether there was an environment conducive to capital expenditures created by market valuations. Table 13 and Figure 11 present the calculations for Tobin's q, and examine the potential relationship between market valuations, incentives for investments in the respective 30 The balance sheet reflects a company's depreciated tangible assets only, while the market value of a company's securities is the best indicator of future profit potential, since it provides an estimate of future cash flows attributable to all the company's assets.
Average Economic Value Added, 1992-1996
-15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10% 15% through the equity market. In this context, it is notable as well is that the peak of Tobin q in Asia is around 1993-94, a period associated with large portfolio equity inflows. 31 A limitation of this analysis is the use depreciated balance sheet data, and lack of replacement costs.
Hong
However, I employ Tobin q mainly in a comparative and relative sense, rather than absolute sense. H o n g K o n g I n d o n e s i a K o r e a M a l a y s i a P h i l i p p i n e s S i n g a p o r e T a i w a n T h a i l a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a F r a n c e G e r m a n y J a p a n U S A
SECTION C: EPILOGUE TO CORPORATE FINANCE PRACTICES-THE CRISIS
The data used for the previous analysis ends in December 1996. What has happened since than? A partial picture emerges from recent investment bank research reports. We know that damage ensuing from high leverage in a raising interest rates, and worsening Sachs' 34 to estimate the companies will not be able to service debt. The findings in Table   14 document a rapid increase in the percentage of loans (and companies) in distress in 1998. In Indonesia 45.6 percent of corporates are distressed, in Korea 31.5 percent of corporates, and in Malaysia 18.5 percent of corporates. An analysis done by Jardine Fleming to assess the impact of exposure to unhedged foreign exchange loans suggests that Indonesian corporates are virtually insolvent. Following in these companies write-off the foreign exchange losses (and do not capitalize their forex translation losses 37 ) the aggregate balance sheet at the current exchange rate of Rph 11,500/US$ will show a negative equity of Rph 79.6 trillion. ($6.98 billion @ Rph 11,500/US$). Similar impact is being felt throughout the Asian region. Source: Jardine Fleming
The erosion of equity capital, and maturity structure of debt in Asia indicates that corporates have massive equity and debt recapitalization needs. Within the limitations of credit extension by a distressed banking system, the prospects for credit extensions, and new financing are limited. Similarly, recapitalization plans that rely heavily on equity markets' capacity, and rights offerings might not be realistic in the current depressed stock markets, and domestic bond markets are not sufficiently developed to absorb potential demand. Therefore, the prospects of corporate to fulfill their recapitalization needs are questionable at this time. 37 The accounting convention used does not matter. The economic impact of the loss is the same.
SECTION C: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Several conclusions are warranted from this financial analysis presented in the paper:
Financial benchmarks. The findings in the paper suggest a manifested lack of financial (and some lack of operational) discipline in some Asian countries. Thailand, Indonesia, Korea stand as a beacon of risky practices that lead to financial distress. The investmentspending spree contributed to erosion of profit margins, and to poor financial performance reflected in declining, and low return on equity and return on capital employed. Other countries in the region: Hong Kong, Malaysia and Taiwan, manifest prudent financial conduct 38 .
A further surprising finding is the wide disparity in financing practices, and even more so, 39 Provided that the legal system has provisions for such lending, lenders can grant new credit that has priority for repayment. 40 See Veneroso and Wade, op cit.
Citing one absolute statistic-the bond market in Asia is under 20% of GDP, low by comparison to developed bond markets -e.g., the US bond market is over 100% of GDP. In a relative context, the comparative statistics presented in Figure 13 is instructive.
They suggest that in general, the region has exhibited over-dependence on the banking sector and under-reliance on capital markets in absolute and relative terms. the Exhibit documents the lack of relative balance in development of financial markets. K o n g I n d o n e s ia K o r e a m a la y s ia P h il ip p in e s S in g a p o r e T h a il a n d E a s t A s ia G e r m a n y , J a p a n , U K , U S A
Bond market
Equity market
Bank assets
Source: Emerging Asian Bond Market, Financial Times 1997
The implication of the analysis is that a more open, balanced and competitive financial system, in which capital is more allocated in a more transparent fashion, and with appropriate consideration for risk is needed in Asia 41 . A first macro remedial step is offered by the overwhelming evidence of high leverage witnessed in Asia, and analysis of the underlying macro financial linkages of intermediation through the banking system. An inescapable conclusion, is that in addition to rehabilitation of the banking system, the policy agenda in Asia should strive for development of domestic capital markets. H o n g K o n g I n d o n e s i a K o r e a M a l a y s i a P h i l i p p i n e s S i n g a p o r e T h a i l a n d L a t i n A m e r i c a F r a n c e Therefore a possible implications is that the "exuberant" valuations in East Asia were associated with large portfolio equity inflows in an illiquid market. In such a situation Regulatory and Supervisory Framework. Finally, the findings deepen our understanding of the crisis, and offer lessons for the future. There were clearly micro excesses, within a disciplined and benign macro financial context. In the past, there were several safety mechanisms built into the Asian financial system to manage the micro risks. Among them, mild interest rates oppression subsidized corporations to the detriment of savers. Second, well established long-term relations between companies and banks, which turned debt into quasi-equity (the proverbial Asian evergreens"). This relationship suggests lax credit allocation processes, (possibly supporting projects of politically connected individuals and organizations), without reference to projects viability. The preponderance of the evidence collaborates Krugman's hypothesis that crony capitalism, and the supportive and necessary poor policies designed to "aid and abate" poor credit decisions-implicit government guarantees, and lax banking supervision lead to poor investments, and misallocation of resources. Asia lead to a plausible explanation of the mixture of currency, corporate and banking crises confronting the region. These recent liberalization of the financial sector and imposition of market discipline, including lifting of interest rate controls, was undertaken without adequate prudential framework. The implications for enhanced regulation and supervision of the financial system are unmistakable. The recent introduction of improved loan classification systems and capital adequacy norms 45 are welcomed and encouraging first steps toward improved regulation and supervision, but are nevertheless only preliminary first steps that need to be supplemented by an enhanced regulatory framework and improved enforcement.
-END- 45 . The increased scrutiny to credit quality probably contributed to the recent adverse developments. For instance: enhanced regulatory and supervisory efforts addressed at Thai finance companies lead to revelations about their poor condition, and possibly precipitated the onset of the crisis. 
